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I. DOCUMENT AMENDMENT PROCEDURE 
This document can be amended by the authors further to any feedback from other teams or people. 
Minor changes, such as spelling corrections, content formatting or minor text re-organization not 
affecting the content and meaning of the document can be applied by the authors without peer review. 
Other changes must be submitted for peer review and to the EMI PEB for approval. 
When the document is modified for any reason, its version number shall be incremented accordingly. 
The document version number shall follow the standard EMI conventions for document versioning. 
The document shall be maintained in the CERN CDS repository and be made accessible through the 
OpenAIRE portal. 
 
II. GLOSSARY 
Acronym Long Name 
AA Attribute Authority. See http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3820.txt 
AAI Authentication and Authorization Infrastructure 
AC Attribute Certificate: A special case of an X.509 certificate. See  http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3281.txt for details. 
ACL Access Control List: List of rules regulating access to a resource or entity 
AP Authentication Profile 
ARC Advanced Resource Connector 
BDII Berkeley Database Information Index: An LDAP-based information system, where information about the current state of the Grid is stored. 
CA Certificate Authority: An internal entity or trusted third party that issues, signs, revokes and manages digital certificates. 
Certificate Information issued by a trusted party. Used to identify an individual or system. 
CE Computing Element: a Grid-enabled computing resource 
Credentials Evidence asserting the user’s right to access certain systems (e.g. username, password, etc) 
CRL Certificate Revocation List 
CSR Certificate Signing Request 
CREAM Computing Resource Execution and Management: The gLite CE framework developed by INFN. 
DN Distinguished Name to uniquely denote a user or entity. The DN is typically used in directories like X.500 and LDAP, but also within X.509 certificates. 
DPM Disk Pool Manager 
EGEE Enabling Grids for E-sciencE: EU funded Grid project 
End Entity System (individual, host, service) that receives a certificate expressing its identity 
EES Execution Environment Service: Service internal to the new authorization system, which is being implemented within EGEE-III. 
EUGRIDP International organization to coordinate the trust fabric for e-Science Grid 
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MA authentication in Europe. See http://www.eugridpma.org for details. 
Federated 
Identity 
Management and use of identity information across security domains, e.g. between 
members of a federation. Federated identity inevitably deals with issues like liability, 
security, privacy and trust. 
FQAN Fully Qualified Attribute Name: A string containing VOMS group and  (optionally) role information. 
FTS File Transfer Service: A service, which allows to transfer a collection of files between a source and a destination. 
GA Generic Attribute: VOMS attributes in the format of key-value pairs. 
GACL Grid Access Control List: a Grid specific ACL 
GID Group IDentifier in the Unix operating system 
gLite Middleware stack developed by the EGEE project 
Globus A Grid middleware stack. See http://www.globus.org for details. 
GLUE Grid Laboratory Uniform Environment: An abstract information model for the Grid. See http://forge.ogf.org/sf/projects/glue-wg for details. 
GSI Grid Security Infrastructure: the PKI infrastructure that has been customized and extended for the Grid by the Globus project. 
IGTF 
International Grid Trust Federation: Body with the goal to harmonize and synchronize 
PMAs policies to establish and maintain global trust relationships in e-Science. See 
http://www.igtf.org for details. 
Internet2 A consortium, led by the research and education community, which promotes advanced networking in the USA. 
ITU International Telecommunication Union: International organization established to standardize and regulate international radio and telecommunication. 
ITU-T International Telecommunication Standardization Sector 
LCAS Local Centre Authorization Service: An authorization framework, which authorizes Grid users based on their X.509 credential. 
LCMAPS Local Centre MAPing Service: A framework, which maps Grid credentials to local accounts on a host attached to the Grid. 
LFC LHC File Catalogue: A file catalogue developed by the LCG project. 
LRMS Local Resource Management System: the batch system behind the Grid CE framework. 
MICS 
Member Integrated Credential Service: An IGTF profile for issuing (long-lived) X.509 
certificates to End Entities based on an identity management system operated by an 
institution. 
MWSG 
Middleware Security Group: An informal working group for security architects and 
knowledgeable security individuals from EGEE, OSG, OMII-Europe and other Grid 
projects. 
MyProxy A Grid service used for storing and issuing certificates as well as renewing expiring certificates. It was developed by the Globus project. [R17] 
NREN National Research and Education Network 
OSCP Online Certificate Status Protocol 
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OSCT Operational Security Coordination Team: Team that is responsible for ensuring the overall security coordination in EGEE. 
PAP Policy Administration Point 
PDP Policy Decision Point 
PEP Policy Enforcement Point 
PKI 
Public Key Infrastructure: Processes and technologies used to issue and manage 
digital certificates, enabling third parties to authenticate individual users, services and 
hosts. 
PMA Policy Management Authority: Body responsible for defining minimum standards for the CP/CPSs of a PKI infrastructures and accrediting against those standards 
Principle Participant in a security operation. It can be a service or a user. 
Pseudony
mity 
Describes a state of disguised identity resulting from the consistent use of another, 
unknown name. 
Resource 
Provider Synonym for site. 
SAML Security Assertion Markup Language: XML standard for exchanging authentication and authorization data. 
SCAS Site Central Authorization Service 
SE Storage Element: a Grid enabled storage resource. 
Shibboleth 
Federated identity management solution from Internet2/MACE (Middleware 
Architecture Committee for Education). It is the name of the architecture as well as 
the name of the open source implementation. 
Short-lived 
X.509  
certificate 
An X.509 certificate with a life time of less than 1 million seconds (approx. 11 days) 
Site Organization having administrative control of resources  provided to the Grid. This may be at one physical location of spread across multiple locations. 
SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol 
SRM Storage Resource Management 
StoRM Storage Resource Manager 
ssss Shamir’s secret sharing scheme: A scheme for distributing a secret among a group of participants. http://point-at-infinity.org/ssss/ 
STS 
Security Token Service: A Web service that authenticates clients by validating 
credentials that are presented by a client. It can issue to a client a security token for a 
successfully authenticated client. 
Trusted 
Third 
Party 
(TTP) 
Entity, which facilitates interactions between two parties who both trust the third 
party. They use this trust to secure their own interactions. A CA is an example of a 
TTP. 
UI User Interface: host from where the user interacts with the Grid software in the gLite middleware environment. 
UID User IDentifier in the Unix operating system 
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VO Virtual Organization 
VOMS VO Management Service (may sometimes also refer to the server hosting the service.) 
WMS Workload Management System: a central broker for job submission and management 
WN Worker Node: the entity where jobs get executed 
X.509 A standard for public key infrastructures. It defines among other things standard formats for certificates. See http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2459.txt for details. 
XACML eXtensible Access Control Markup Language - a declarative access control policy language implemented in XML 
The complete EMI glossary is available at https://twiki.cern.ch/twiki/bin/view/EMI/EmiGlossary . 
 
III. COPYRIGHT NOTICE 
Copyright (c) Members of the EMI Collaboration. 2010-2013. 
See http://www.eu-emi.eu/about/Partners/ for details on the copyright holders. 
EMI (“European Middleware Initiative”) is a project partially funded by the European Commission.  
For more information on the project, its partners and contributors please see http://www.eu-emi.eu. 
This document is released under the Open Access license. You are permitted to copy and distribute 
verbatim copies of this document containing this copyright notice, but modifying this document is not 
allowed. You are permitted to copy this document in whole or in part into other documents if you 
attach the following reference to the copied elements: "Copyright (C) 2010-2013. Members of the 
EMI Collaboration. http://www.eu-emi.eu". The information contained in this document represents the 
views of EMI as of the date they are published. EMI does not guarantee that any information 
contained herein is error-free, or up to date. EMI makes no warrantees, express, implied, or statutory, 
by publishing this document. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This document describes the various architectures of the three middlewares that comprise the EMI 
software stack. It also outlines the common efforts in the security area that allow interoperability 
between these middlewares. The assessment of the EMI Security presented in this document was 
performed internally by members of the Security Area of the EMI project. This assessment was 
performed on a one-time basis specifically for this document and is given in the Section 10 
“Assessment, Strengths, ideas for improvement”. 
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2. OVERVIEW OF THE EMI SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
This section describes, at a high level, the components that provide the security for the EMI 
middleware stack. The current overall EMI middleware stack is the result of a combination of 
developments of previous Grid middleware projects: ARC, gLite and UNICORE and independent 
software products (dCache and StoRM). The underlying security models of the three software stacks 
remain unchanged and differ between each stack. The gLite security architecture is described in [R33], 
UNICORE in [R34] and ARC security documentation in [R35]. 
As such, there is no “EMI Security Architecture” that supersedes the security models of each stack. 
The EMI project has worked on extending and modifying some existing components and producing 
new components in order to facilitate the interoperability and improve the uniformity between the 
stacks. Profiles for Authentication and Authorization have been produced. These modifications and 
additions have been made with input from general security concepts of the software development on 
one hand and the actual experience of deploying and securely operating the EGI and WLCG 
infrastructures on the other hand. 
It should also be kept in mind, that the security infrastructure must not only satisfy the security 
requirements, but it must also be practical and easy to use by site administrators, security personnel 
and users. During this period of development, the existing Grid infrastructure could not be interrupted   
and therefore the changes made are incremental and with the agreement of the operators. 
In this chapter the main building blocks of the EMI security are presented. It starts with the definition 
of the term “security architecture” and defines the usage of the terms “trust”, “authentication” and 
“authorization”. It then continues with a description of the virtual organization and its relation to sites 
before enumerating the main security building blocks. In doing so, the document tries to strike a 
balance between presenting high-level security concepts and its actual implementation in EMI. 
 
2.1. DEFINITION OF A SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
Within the context of this document, the term “security architecture”1 is defined as “a set of features 
and services that tackles a set of security requirements and can handle a set of use cases”. 
The term service is used here in a broader sense than (web) service, which is the common jargon in 
other documents, and also includes infrastructure and user-driven services such as certification, 
auditing and incident response procedures. 
According to [R2], the security architecture is composed of building blocks, called facilities. Each 
facility can be viewed as an atomic piece of functionality that facilitates some security requirement. 
The facilities should be factored orthogonally against each other, such that their use is optional, and 
keeping the number of interdependencies to a minimum, allowing for individual advancements of 
respective technologies and mechanisms used in the implementation of individual architectures. 
The facilities, along with a short description, are listed in Table 1. The definitions were taken from 
[R2]. 
 
Functionality Facility Short Description 
Logging and Auditing Logging A common infrastructure for the recording of 
system events for tracking, accountability, and 
auditing purposes. 
Auditing The auditing system uses information recorded 
about system and user activity for the purposes 
1 As defined in [R1]. 
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of accountability and security assurance. 
Authentication Identity credentials and 
trust infrastructure 
The identification of users, agents, hosts, and 
services, when they interact with each other. 
Short-lived credential 
services 
Short-lived credential services (SLCS) leverage 
the organizational or federated authentication 
infrastructure and issue (short-lived) Grid 
credentials to their users. 
Enforcing validity 
constraints 
Additional validation tests are required to 
assess that credentials (in particular proxy 
certificates) are adhering to established 
operational policies. 
Revocation The process of invalidating a credential and the 
secure distributed propagation of such status 
change information. 
Certificate renewal The automated, yet controlled and managed, 
renewal of short-lived credentials and 
authorization assertions. 
Anonymity, privacy, 
pseudonymity 
The controlled protection of user identities and 
data, and escrow of the same for management 
and authorities. 
Bootstrapping 
authentication 
A collective term for the initial security 
mechanisms that can be used to acquire a Grid 
credential. 
Credential store The controlled secure management of user 
credentials, to permit the enforcement of key 
hygiene. 
Key Management Key hygiene Enforcement of proper handling practices of 
user held credentials. 
Encryption key 
management 
The secure management of cryptographic keys 
that in turn protect data stored in encrypted 
form. 
Authorization Authorization services A collective term for the (centralized) services 
used to manage access control (typically one 
per VO) 
Mutual authorization The process in which both parties authorize 
each other before engaging in a message 
exchange, typically to avoid information 
leakage. 
Authorization framework A framework that collect and combines policies 
and information from several sources using 
pluggable extensions. 
Authorization interfaces to 
existing systems 
An authorization interface to existing and 
legacy systems, which allows a combined and 
flexible decision-making process by taking into 
account information, assertions and policies 
from a variety of authorities. 
Delegation Delegation The capability of transferring rights and 
privileges to allow for a principal (e.g. an 
application or a user) to act on your behalf. 
Sandboxing Securing the hosted to 
native interface 
Isolating the (user-provided) applications from 
each other and from the local system as much 
as possible, while preserving the appearance of 
transparent access to shared remote resources. 
INFSO-RI-261611 2010-2013 © Members of EMI collaboration PUBLIC 10 / 48 
 EMI SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
 Doc. Identifier: EMI-DOC-JRA1-EMI_Security_Architecture_v1.0 
 
 
Network isolation Dynamically adapting firewall policy to 
enforce strict rules yet being able to obey the 
connectivity needs of (some) users and 
applications. 
Table 1: EMI Security Facilities 
 
2.2. TRUST, AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORIZATION: A TERMINOLOGY 
The concepts of trust, authentication and authorization are often poorly defined or confused. This 
section provides a short description of these terms with a focus on X.509 credentials. 
• Under Trust - the process of ensuring that the issuer of a credential, and the credential itself, is 
trustworthy. 
• Under Authentication - the process of ensuring a credential is valid and belongs to the 
individual that presents it. 
• Under Authorization - the process of checking that a person has the rights to perform an 
operation. Authorization can be issued based on several criteria, such as, for example, the 
identity of the person or attributes provided about the person by a trusted third party. 
Note that trust and authentication are often meshed together, but as a matter of fact they should be 
treated separately. For example, one can establish trust without authentication. Authentication and 
authorization are often (wrongly) understood as being just two sides of the coin. Today, it is generally 
accepted that a good design clearly separates authentication and authorization. 
 
Trust evaluation in a PKI infrastructure may include: 
• Ensuring the certificate is not expired. 
• Ensuring the signature of the certificate still matches. 
• Ensuring the certificate is issued by a trusted CA (this includes checking the trust chain). 
 
Authentication in a PKI infrastructure may include: 
• Ensuring the user has the private key to the certificate that he provides. (Note: This does not 
mean that the holder of the private key is the intended recipient of the private key). 
• Ensuring the user continues to provide the correct SSL session key. 
• Performing a trust evaluation on a certificate. 
 
Authorization in a Grid environment may include: 
• Ensuring that the DN is present in a configuration file that lists all authorized users. 
• Ensuring that an attribute2 listed in the extension of the certificate has a certain value in order 
to perform an operation, e.g. installing software. 
 
2.3. VIRTUAL ORGANIZATIONS, SITES AND COMMON SERVICES 
In Grid environments users can be organized in so called virtual organizations (VO). They allow the 
management of users across different institutions without the need to observe intra-institutional 
management structures and policies. 
2 The user’s proxy certificate may contain a so-called attribute certificate, which contains attributes describing 
the user as member in a VO (see Section 2.3). 
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Sites3 on the other hand correspond to local installations of computing resources (clusters, storage, 
etc.). Agreements are made, between the individual sites and VOs that give the members of a VO 
access to the resources of the sites. In order to do so, sites must install the services of the middleware 
chosen by the VO. It is important to note that the support of VOs by sites does not mean that the site 
hands over some of its autonomy, particularly in security issues, to VOs. On the contrary, the local site 
autonomy must be preserved and respected by the VO and its members at all times. 
Besides VO and sites, there are also a set of common services that act as a glue between VOs and sites. 
They can be considered as a part of the underlying Grid infrastructure and are typically operated by 
some of the larger sites on behalf of the infrastructure. Examples are information services, credential 
stores, management services for VOs etc. 
Figure 1 shows the high level picture of the EMI components divided into the elements of VOs, sites 
and common services. The EMI middleware consists of the following software components: 
• User Interface UI: Suite of components through which the user interacts with the Grid 
(submitting of jobs, querying component status, access to data stored on the Grid, etc.). The 
user needs to possess a X.509 certificate in order to interact with the Grid services, because 
the EMI security model is currently entirely PKI-based.  The UI contains clients that interact 
with ARC, gLite and UNICORE services. 
• CA: A certificate authority provides the X.509 credential to the user. The CAs are coordinated 
through the international Grid trust federation (IGTF) and are outside the purview of the EMI 
security project.  Note that CAs also issue host or service certificates to identify hosts and 
services. 
• VO services: Users are permitted to access the Grid due to their VO membership. Currently; 
ARC and gLite use the Virtual Organization Management Service (VOMS). UNICORE uses 
UNICORE Virtual Organization Service (UVOS). 
• Common services: These are services that span the Grid and may serve one or more VOs at 
the same time. Examples are the information system, file catalogues and resource brokers. 
• Credential services: The special class of services, which act either as: 
o An attribute authority (AA)4     
o A proxy certificate store and renewal service (MyProxy [R17]). 
• Site-specific software components: These are the Grid services that the individual sites 
operate. They comprise of Compute Elements (CE) and Storage Element (SE) services. The 
user can either access these services directly or through resource brokers and/or file 
catalogues. 
 
3 The terminology of the Joint Security Policy Group has been used in this document; refer to the glossary for a 
definition of the term “site”. 
4 VOMS is the AA in use. 
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Figure 1 Overview of the EMI architecture 
 
Table 2 lists the EMI-supported software components. Each of these components must support the 
needed security features as given by the above-mentioned facilities. 
 
Class of 
Service Software Component EMI supported instance 
VO services VO management system VOMS and UVOS 
 User ID protection pseudonymity 
Common 
services 
Information system Berkeley Database Information Index (BDII), EMI 
Registry 
 File catalogues LCG File Catalogue (LFC) 
 Store for proxy certificates MyProxy 
 Short-lived (site-integrated) 
credential services 
Security Token Service (STS) 
 Resource broker Workload Management Service (WMS) 
 File Transfer Service File Transfer Service (FTS) 
Site-specific 
services 
Compute Element (CE) Compute Resource Execution and Management 
Service (CREAM), ARC A-REX 
 Storage Element (SE) Disk Pool Manager (DPM), dCache, StoRM, 
Hydra 
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 Authorization service Argus 
 User identity switching gLExec 
 Virtual Machine provisioning Argus-EES 
Table 2: EMI Security Components 
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3. AUTHENTICATION 
Authentication5 (AuthN) is concerned with identifying entities (users, agents, and services) when 
establishing a context for message exchange between principles. One of the key aims for Grid 
authentication is enabling single sign-on for the user – using a single identity credential with 
“universal” value across many different infrastructures, different communities and virtual 
organizations and multiple applications. As such, attention must be paid to the fact that the same 
identity is also to be used for other purposes: accessing non-Grid resources such as networks and web 
resources; or in interaction with government and administration. 
 
The authentication model for EMI is largely based on the EGEE model that uses the concept of trusted 
third parties (TTPs): entities that are not related to any relying party except through a trust 
relationship. Underlying that trust relationship is the digital signature of the TTP, based on 
conventional asymmetric cryptography. The TTP will bind the cryptographic key pair to one or more 
identifiers that represent the entity. Although theoretically a single TTP could service the entire 
community, in practice a mesh of TTPs exist. The mesh defines a common authentication domain, by 
grouping the resources, users, and services that agree to use a common set of TTPs for authentication. 
The authentication domain, however, does neither imply common rights-of-access nor does it 
constitute an “infrastructure” of sorts. Although the EGEE project assumes a set of TTPs is used, it 
does not suggest that all entities accept this set. This introduces an additional failure mode that higher-
level services should cover anticipate and handle. 
 
The strength of an authentication credential issued by a TTP is dependent on three things: 
• The trust on the TTP, in particular the TTP’s operations, procedures and general conduct. 
• The quality of the original identity vetting. No amount of technology can overcome weak 
identity checking at the source. The use of appropriately qualified authorities in the credential 
issuing process is important. The vetting can be performed as part of the issuing process when 
a photo-ID is shown in-person – a system which is supporting of thinly-spread users or 
relatively small constituencies. Alternatively, it can leverage pre-existing assured credentials, 
such as those maintained by the subscribers’ employer or university, and made available 
through an authentication and authorization federation (AAI federation). In the latter case, it 
should be based on in-person vetting at some stage of the process or established to an 
equivalent assurance level like Kantara LoA 2, but the issuance can pursue automatically 
without human intervention at that time. This setup requires a mature federation and AAI 
identity providers, but scales better to large constituencies (examples include the TERENA 
Certificate Service deployed widely in Europe, or the CILogon service leveraging the 
InCommon federation in the US). 
• The security of the private data needed to prove possession of the credential. This is further 
discussed in Section 4. 
 
The International Grid Trust Federation (IGTF) and its European constituent EuGridPMA have been 
established and expanded over the course of the EGEE project. They are the orchestration bodies for 
the TTPs and define Authentication Profiles (AP) for identity provisioning. The advantages of such a 
standardized approach across the many partners of EGI as well as across several Grid middlewares 
and Grid infrastructures cannot be overemphasized. 
5 Large sections of this chapter have been taken from [R1] and adapted to the current situation. This reflects the 
mature status of the authentication in the security architecture. See also Section 2.2 for a description of the terms 
trust and authentication. 
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3.1. IDENTITY CREDENTIAL FORMATS 
In accordance with the standards as defined by IGTF, X.509v3 public key certificates [R7] are used to 
express identity assertions. These certificates are issued by Certification Authorities (CA), which are 
accredited by the IGTF. Different types of CAs exist (see below), as well as different means of 
delivering certificates to end-entities. Whatever the delivery mechanism or operational mode of the 
CA, the authentication is based on at least the distinguished name (DN) of the subject contained 
therein. 
While the distinguished name may contain information about the user such as name, organizational 
affiliation and email address, this document does not make any assumption on these fields. The 
distinguished name is only considered as a unique identifier, which bears no semantics. In order to 
facilitate a single-sign on for Grid resources as part of the authorization process, EMI security 
components also support proxy certificates as defined in [R8]. Proxy certificates are normal X.509 
identity certificates, but equipped with an extension that ensures their rejection by applications that do 
not support proxy certificates. 
• Those proxies are used to perform two tasks: single sign-on AND delegation. 
• Proxies are a necessary artefact for gLite, ARC and dCache. UNICORE does not rely on 
proxies for sign-on or delegation. Therefore the all explanations and discussions on proxies 
are not relevant for the UNICORE stack. 
• As a result of some EMI development, UNICORE may be accessed using a proxy certificate. 
In this case the proxy is not used for delegation; it is used for single sign-on and UNICORE 
authenticates the credential. 
 
Two different types of certificates can be distinguished based on their lifetime: 
 
1. Long-lived (typically one year) certificates, which are issued according to the “classic” AP or 
the “Member Integrated Credential Service” (MICS) AP. A MICS certificate is issued by an 
automated system based on a pre-existing identity management system maintained by an 
organization or federation. 
2. Short-lived (i.e. less than 1 million seconds, approx. 11 days) certificates, which are issued 
according to the Short-lived Credential Service (SLCS) AP. 
 
It should be noted that most CAs accord to the “classic” AP, with MICS and SLCS based CAs only 
gaining attention recently. 
 
Over the past few years, security architectures, which do not use X.509 certificates as identity 
credentials, have gained significant interest. Authentication and Authorization Infrastructures6 (AAI) 
based on the concept of federated identity have been established in several European countries, often 
coordinated by National Research and Education Networks (NRENs). They typically comprise tens or 
even hundreds of thousands of users. These AAIs use SAML assertions to express authentication 
information and user attribute values. Whereas the EMI Security team does not foresee replacing PKI 
as the basis of the security architecture over the next years, it does expect interoperability issues to 
gain in importance. The key concept to implement is the generic support of security tokens without 
requiring a specific token format. Security Token Services (STS) can then be used to exchange a given 
token into one of a different format. 
3.2. BOOTSTRAPPING AUTHENTICATION 
The process of bootstrapping authentication is well established for services and users. For services the 
6 There exist several implementations of AAIs. Shibboleth of Internet2 has gained the widest acceptance in 
Europe. 
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administrator requests a service certificate from an accredited CA, which they install on the host. 
Typically, the Grid service must then be configured to use this host credential. 
 
For users, it consists of obtaining a certificate from an accredited CA. Before accessing Grid services, 
the user must create7 a proxy certificate, which contains a VO specific extension, the VOMS Attribute 
Certificate (AC). The AC contains the set of attributes that the user has within the context of the VO. 
(See Section 5 and [R14] on the usage of these attributes in authorization decisions). For the 
UNICORE case the authentication is bootstrapped with classic SSL/TLS using the regular X.509 
client certificate. 
 
3.3. ENFORCING VALIDITY CONSTRAINTS 
Proxy certificates are typically stored with a weaker protection level (stored in clear text and 
safeguarded only by local file system privileges). As a consequence, security policy often declares that 
proxy certificates should not be trusted if issued with a longer validity: A lifetime of 24 hours is 
normally requested, with longer-lived proxy certificates mandated to be stored in a keystore such as 
MyProxy [R17]. Currently, there are unresolved issue that should be resolved by the various operators, 
users and VOs of the Grid. 
 
3.4.  EMI COMMON AUTHENTICATION LIBRARIES 
The EMI Common AuthenticatioN Libraries (CANl) are a set of libraries implemented along common 
principles, following common API architecture, and introducing shared error codes. Multiple language 
versions are available, namely C, C++ and Java, each implemented in parallel but given the shared 
development effort, different language versions on server/client side are mutually compatible. On top 
of the common authentication features, each language version can offer additional functions required 
in the application area. 
3.4.1 C library 
The C version of CANl provides basic support for communication management channel establishment 
and message protection (creation of secured sockets on server and client side). It is done via core API 
without a direct SSL/X.509 dependency. Thus CANl C is easily portable outside the PKI world. 
A higher level API provides support for SSL and X.509 (SSL specifics for connections can be set). 
CANl C handles certificate management (proxy certificates are fully supported), i.e.: 
• Proxy certificate signing request generation (including key pair generation with some 
restrictions on key length with respect to generated certificate lifetime). 
• Certificate signing and verification (CRL and OCSP are supported). 
• CANl C also supports usage of hardware security tokens – PKCS #11. 
The CANl C library has already been successfully integrated into the gridsite software package. The 
reduction and simplification of the gridsite code was significant. The adoption of CANl C in L&B 
(Logging & Bookkeeping) and other ANSI C-based products is also planned. 
3.4.2 C++ library 
The C++ EMI common authentication library provides the C++ interface for credential manipulation 
and secure communication. 
The credential manipulation includes CSR (certificate signing request) generation, proxy certificate 
signing, EEC (end entity certificate) signing (useful for short lived certificate signing), and certificate 
verification. The certificate verification supports the CA namespace constraints policies.    Moreover, 
the certificate verification supports the checking of certificate status through certificate revocation list 
7 This process is described in detail in [R14] 
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(CRL) or online certificate status protocol (OCSP) [R11]. For certificate status checking with OCSP, 
both OCSP and its alternative approach - OCSP stapling (formally known as the TLS Certificate Status 
Request extension [R30]) are supported. The OCSP stapling is supported in the secure communication 
and invoked once the peer certificate is verified. 
For the repository of certificates, besides the de-facto file-based credential, C++ library also supports 
the NSS database-based credential through PKCS11 standardization. 
The C++ EMI common authentication library has currently been integrated into the pre-production 
version of one of the ARC client utilities - arcproxy. Therefore, users can create proxy certificate by 
directly using their credentials from NSS credential database, e.g., credentials used in their Mozilla 
Firefox web browser. 
3.4.3 Java library 
The Java version of the EMI X.509 Common Authentication Library provides support for: 
• Off-line certificate validation 
• Creation of SSL sockets (both server and client side) 
• Handling certificate DNs, also in text format 
• Usage of proxy certificates: from proxy generation to validation 
• Support for CRLs and OCSP 
 
The library provides implementation of an easy to use and flexible validation logic, which can take 
advantage of different trust material sources. Proxy certificates, which are commonly used in the grid 
environment, are fully supported. 
The library can be easily integrated with the standard JSSE stack. Therefore the library does not 
handle the SSL/TLS communication by itself, as this functionality is provided by the standard Java 
library. Moreover the library can be easily integrated with all popular Java communication solutions as 
HTTP client libraries, JMS libraries, Web Service stacks and others. 
Another unique feature of the Java EMI Common authentication library is the support for different  
formats of trust stores (collections of trusted root certificates) such as Openssl-like, plain directory 
with certificates or native Java keystores. The support for multiple formats of trust stores is required to 
maintain backwards compatibility for applications adopting the Java EMI common authentication 
library. PKCS11 and support for hardware security tokens is currently not provided as this requires 
platform dependent drivers. The counter to the fundamental Java principle of portability and therefore 
in the many cases would not be feasible to use. 
 
3.5. REVOCATION 
There are good reasons why the binding between the public part of a key pair and an identifier, or a set 
of identifiers, should be revoked. These include the compromise of the associated private key or 
invalidation of one or more identifiers in the binding. The longer the key-to-identifier binding is 
considered valid, the higher the probability that such a binding will become invalid. 
 
The TTP is responsible for revoking credentials it has issued, but it is up to the relying parties (both 
services and requesters in case of mutual authentication) to ensure that this revocation information is 
consulted. The basic revocation information is distributed as a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) [R7]. 
All authorities recognized as TTPs by the major EMI stakeholders issue revocation information at 
least through such CRLs (although local TTPs in individual installations may not provide this feature 
and thus the software needs to be resilient to a lack of CRL information). 
 
However CRLs are neither the most efficient nor the most secure way to distribute revocation data. On 
the one hand CRLs are pre-fetched by relying parties regardless of their actual use (not every RP will 
be continuously validating credentials from all TTPs), and this periodic retrieval is burdensome on 
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both the RP bandwidth as well as the TTP CRL distribution infrastructure, especially for large TTPs. 
On the other hand, the periodic retrieval introduced delays in revocations becoming effective, given 
the period between subsequent downloads. Timely identity revocation is needed to prevent 
exploitation of credentials that have been compromised. The allowed response time as specified by 
sites is in the order of 10-60 minutes. However, this time cannot be achieved through the periodic 
distribution of CRLs to all parties at a pan-European (or larger) scale. 
 
Therefore, any software component that performs certificate validation should preferably be able to 
check the validity of the credentials in real-time. The Online Certificate Status Protocol [R11] (OCSP) 
is a widely used protocol that facilitates the validation or credentials in real-time. Large-scale 
deployments of OCSP, after it had been introduced in major web browsers and for high-volume web 
sites, have however demonstrated the scaling limitations of traditional OCSP responses. Revised 
profiles of the OCSP standard, in particular light-weight OCSP [R11b], offer better scalability and 
facilitate deployment by the TTP infrastructure.  Although the profiling of light-weight OCSP for 
deployment in the e-Infrastructure is still in progress in the Open Grid Forum, EMI has developed 
implementations addressing the initial use of OCSP. At this time, only few TTPs have made OCSP 
end-points available as a production service and included the appropriate meta-data in the issued 
certificates, but the expected to change with wider availability of OCSP capable software. 
 
The fact that OCSP is a real-time protocol does introduce operational dependencies on the availability 
of the OCSP responders. This has a potential impact on service availability unless responses are 
cached and fall-back to other mechanisms such as CRL parsing is implemented. Fall back to CRL is 
set by default in all EMI validation code, and caching mechanisms are being developed. 
This availability issue (with the corresponding security implications of a deliberate denial-of-service 
against the TTP) is being addressed by the IETF TLS working group via “OCSP Stapling” as part of 
the TLS protocol. At this time, the stapling work is not yet sufficiently mature to have been 
implemented in the server-side code for endpoints. 
 
As such CRLs remain for the foreseeable future the main revocation mechanism. 
 
3.6. CERTIFICATE RENEWAL 
Certificates are equipped with a validity time-stamp and, as such, they expire and need to be renewed. 
There are several techniques that a CA may use to facilitate a trusted remote credential renewal, which 
are not covered in this document. For instance, the CA may choose to: a) simply issue a new certificate 
to the existing user-held key pair; b) require the user to generate a new key pair; c) countersign the 
new key with the old and so on. 
 
3.7. DELEGATION 
Grid computing is somewhat unique in using X.509 credentials for both server and end-user identity 
assertions. In contrast, most commercial systems use X.509 only for identifying servers, with users 
identifying themselves with some ostensibly lighter-weight solution, such as user-name or email 
address and password. However, identifying a user via X.509 provides some advantages, including as 
a natural method of allowing identity delegation via X.509 proxy certificates. 
Often, grid users need to allow a remote service to conduct some activity on their behalf.  For 
example, a user may need to transfer data from a remote storage service to some distinct, remote 
computational service to analyze that data.  To achieve this, either there needs to be a trust relationship 
between these services or one of these services must act on behalf of the grid user for the data transfer.  
As such actions may be difficult to predict and grids tend to have a large number of services, it 
becomes prohibitively expensive to establish pair-wise trust relationships between the services or 
delegate the necessary credentials ahead of time.  Therefore a dynamic mechanism to allow delegation 
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is needed. 
An important security aspect of delegation is the principle of least privilege: one should delegate only 
as much privileges as is necessary for the desired operation.  RFC3820 describes a mechanism for 
constraining delegation by allowing policy elements to be embedded in the credential; however, this 
has proven hard use and is currently not supported.  The exception is support for "limited proxy 
certificate", which are delegated certificates that inherit all rights of its parent except for job 
submission. 
There is currently no agreed standard process by which a client may undergo identity delegation with a 
server: no standards body has developed a protocol to allow X.509 delegation. However, there is a 
common need for delegation and, as a result, there now exist several methods for delegating within 
different communities (even within a single middleware), each of which is incompatible with the 
others. 
Within EMI there was a consultation process to decide on a common approach to delegation. This 
process resulted in a decision to use GridSite Delegation (GSD). This was due to the existence of 
client and server support for both Java and native binary libraries. This level of support means that 
GSD is easy to adopt by any EMI packages that need X.509 delegation. 
Figure 2 shows an example of GSD in use. The client wants a server to undertake some operation that 
will involve it interacting with some remote, third-party server.  Using GSD, the client first checks 
whether the first server already has an appropriate delegated credential.  On discovering no suitable 
credential exists, the client starts the delegation process, in which the first server generates a key-pair 
and a corresponding certificate signing request (CSR), delivers the CSR to the client.  The client then 
signs the request and returns it to the server.  This process results in a new delegated credential 
available from the credential storage at the server.  When triggering some activity that requires this 
delegated credential, the client passes a reference to the delegated credential. The server makes the 
request to the remote server using the referenced credential. Once the operation completes, the client 
instructs the server to destroy the delegated credential to reduce the risk that the delegated credential is 
compromised. 
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The agreement within EMI to use GSD was codified in a formal document [R39]. The document 
describes both delegation in general and GSD specifically. It outlines the responsibilities of the project 
teams to adopt GSD. The document also describes some of the deficiency of GSD, principally some 
problems with the existing technical description of GSD, which conflates protocol definition with 
implementation-specific decisions. The agreement document also includes plans for correcting these 
problems. 
 
As mentioned above, UNICORE does not use proxy certificates for delegation, in order to eliminate 
all proxy-related problems as difficult tracing of invocation chain (proxy certificate impersonates the 
initial issuer) and the problems described in Section 3.3. Instead, in UNICORE the delegation process 
is fully separated from authentication and is performed by issuing special delegation assertions, signed 
by the issuer. This model called Explicit Trust Delegation is described in details in [R34]. As the 
delegation assertions are designed in such a way to be usable only by otherwise properly authenticated 
users, they may be public and there is no strong security requirement on reducing their validity period 
to couple of hours as in case of proxy certificates. This also eliminates the need for their renewal, 
which, in the case of proxy certificates, is described in the next section. 
 
3.8. RENEWAL OF PROXY CERTIFICATES 
The renewal of proxy certificates must be considered separately. It is necessary in order to support 
long running jobs on the Grid. 
 
Figure 2: Gridsite delegation process 
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The renewal procedure (see Figure 3) starts with delegating (see Section 3.7) a user proxy certificate 
of the user into an online keystore such as MyProxy [R17]. The delegation procedure will ensure that a 
newly created public and private key pair has cryptographically become a part of the certificate chain 
stored in a MyProxy service. This stored delegated proxy must be of a longer-lived type, which means 
that it should have a maximum lifetime in the order of two weeks. The user then typically submits jobs 
using a short-lived proxy with a validity length in the order of one day. 
 
When the short-lived proxy is about to expire, a renewal service8 or daemon must detect this and prior 
to expiration it tries to request a new delegation from the previously used online keystore. The renewal 
request to the keystore must be authorized using the almost-expired delegated proxy and can only be 
accepted from pre-configured trusted services. The keystore will use the stored long-lived delegated 
proxy to create a new short-lived delegation to trusted renewers. This procedure can continue as long 
as a valid proxy resides in the keystore. The entire certificate chain needs to be valid at each level in 
the chain. 
 
In a VOMS-enabled (see Section 5) deployed Grid infrastructures such as gLite or ARC, a few extra 
steps have to be taken when renewing the proxy certificate, as not only the proxy certificate but also 
the VOMS AC must be renewed. This could be taken care of by the keystore itself. However, the 
currently deployed keystore MyProxy does not offer this functionality. Therefore the renewal service 
must contact the user’s VOMS server and assemble the VOMS extension into the proxy. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Proxy Renewal Mechanism 
8 This functionality is currently been provided by the renewal service, which is a part of the gLite Workload 
Management Service (WMS). The FTS service also supports a renewal mechanism for long lasting transfers.   
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3.9. ANONYMITY, PRIVACY, PSEUDONYMITY 
Application and user requirements9 call for the possibility of anonymous use of the Grid system: an 
outsider should not be able to deduce a particular user’s activities, such as how much of the resources 
the user consumes or what applications are run. Such information creep is of serious concern to 
applications in areas of highly competitive research, such as biomedicine. 
 
Grids are open-ended distributed systems. As such, protecting ourselves against information creep is 
prohibitive. Even if all information and message exchanges were made on encrypted and authenticated 
connections, analyzing the message exchange patterns would still allow an adversary to deduce 
information on how the system is being used. In fact, true anonymity can only be achieved by all 
parties sending continuous streams of (bogus) data to all other interacting parties at all time: the 
common tactic in the military and intelligence world. 
 
Likewise, the only way in which you can obtain true privacy is by not sharing information or data at 
all, which is contradictory to the very nature and basis for Grid computing. In addition, many sites 
attached to the Grid require in their local site policy the full disclosure of the identity of the user 
regardless whether the local user of the site or a remote user accessing the site through the Grid.  Thus, 
for these requirements, EMI provides best-effort solutions by the addition of a pseudo-anonymity 
(pseudonymity) service and defer on privacy and anonymity. 
 
The pseudonymity service swaps the real identity of a Grid user for a pseudonym, thus hiding it from 
immediate exposure in logs and on the network. The pseudonymity service acts in all regards as 
another TTP, with the addition that it is also trusted to maintain the relationship between the 
pseudonym and real identity in confidential and secret manner. This trust has to be also kept unless 
law enforcement or a similar legitimate body requires it as part of, for example, an investigation on 
malicious use. 
 
 
Figure 4 Use of the pseudonymity service 
 
To acquire a pseudonym identity, a user performs the following steps (see Figure 4): 
1. The user obtains their normal authentication credential, for example: Joe. 
2. The user authenticates using Joe to the pseudonymity service, which then issues a short-lived 
identity, Zyx, to the user. 
9 Note that national as well as EU legislation also set requirements on privacy and anonymity. 
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3a.   The pseudonymity service registers the pseudonym, Zyx, to the attribute authority as an alias 
to the original identity, Joe. 
3b.  The user authenticates to the attribute authority using Zyx credentials and obtains the 
attributes originally issued to Joe. 
4.   The user is now bootstrapped with a pseudonym credential Zyx and the necessary access 
privileges bound to that credential to make use of Grid services. 
 
In the Grid VO model, the user’s real identity is revealed to the pseudonymity service (the 
authentication trust anchor) and the VO service (the authorization trust anchor). The assumption is 
there is no need to hide the true identity of a user from the other members of the same VO. 
 
The pseudonymity service has been implemented during EGEE-II and is part of the EMI software 
release. 
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4. FEDERATED IDENTITIES 
The experiences of the past years have shown that the management of private keys by the end user is a 
significant entry barrier for the wide adoption of Grid technology. PKI technology has turned out to be 
not easily understood by many users, and the average user often ends up leaving weakly protected 
copies of this certificate on various untrusted systems. 
Several other technologies were investigated during the all phases of the EGEE projects, but no final 
conclusions had been reached by that point [R1, R2, and R28]. 
In the EMI project a new general purpose service, Security Token Service (STS) has been designed 
based on the responses given in the "AAI needs of the DCIs" workshop [R29]. 
As Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) can be considered as the de-facto standard in the 
national and international federations, federated identities are supported in the EMI by transforming 
the SAML assertions into the Grid identities using STS. 
4.1. SECURITY TOKEN SERVICE 
The Security Token Service (STS) is a partial implementation of the OASIS WS-Trust specification. It 
is a service that can be used for transforming an existing security token into another security token 
format. A security token is defined in the WS-Security specifications as a collection of claims that can 
be attached into a Web Service message. The WS-Trust specification employs an open content model 
within its request and response messages. This provides maximal extensibility but also means there is 
a theoretically infinite number of messages that could be produced and yet remain compliant with the 
specification. EMI STS uses a WS-Trust interoperability profile which attempts to strike a balance 
between the extensibility offered by the WS-Trust specification and the need to scope that 
functionality into a manageable set. 
The token formats that will be supported by EMI STS implementation include Username/Password 
token, X.509 certificate, X.509 proxy certificate and SAML assertion. Existing external sources such 
as online Certificate Authorities, online credential repositories, VOMS and SAML authorities can be 
exploited by STS for aggregating the required information for the security tokens issued. By enabling 
the token transformation, STS can establish a trust relationship between different security and 
application domains. The current implementation of the STS focuses on a subset of all the possible 
functionality outlined with the WS-Trust specification. Specifically it implements the issuance of 
X.509 certificates and proxy certificates by exploiting the supported security tokens. 
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Figure 5: Overview of STS components 
 
From the point of view of the client the STS is a Web Service that, like any other Web Services, is 
accessed using the SOAP protocol. This means that any party capable of producing specified request 
messages and understanding response messages can act as a client for the STS. As the SOAP protocol 
is extremely widely adopted, many building blocks exist for implementing a client to STS. This was 
not dependent on the platform, programming language or even deployment: the STS client can be for 
instance a simple command-line tool, a local heavy client with rich GUI, or a Web portal. Figure 5 
illustrates the overall architecture of STS. The architecture is modular and support for additional 
security token formats can be easily added. 
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5. AUTHORIZATION 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Authorization (AuthZ) is concerned with allowing or denying access to services based on policies. The 
core problem with authorization in the Grid environment is how to handle the overlay of policies from 
multiple administrative domains (VO policies, operational procedures, policies of the local sites) and 
how to combine them. 
Early Grid deployments based authorization on the identity of the user (e.g. the Distinguished Name of 
the certificate). Whereas this approach is very simple and intuitive, it does not scale or support more 
sophisticated authorization policies. 
Attribute-based authorization overcomes the limitations of identity-based authorization and is the 
authorization mechanism that has been chosen for EMI. It requires two kinds of components: 
• Attribute Authorities (AA), which associate a user with a set of attributes in a trusted manner 
to a relying party by way of digitally signed assertions. Note, that several attribute authorities 
in a Grid deployment may assert attributes.  EMI currently supports one two AA - the VO 
Membership Service (VOMS) [R12] and UVOS. VOMS is considered the primary solution as 
it may be used by all middleware stacks, while UVOS only by UNICORE. VOMS assigns two 
types of attributes10 to the user: memberships in an arbitrary number of hierarchical groups, 
and roles that the user may or may not assert on a case-by-case basis. VOMS issues X.509 
attribute certificates (AC) [R13], which contain a list of strings, so-called Fully Qualified 
Attribute Names (FQAN), corresponding to the role and group membership associated with a 
particular user. These ACs are then embedded in the proxy certificate of the user and are thus 
available to the Grid resources at authorization time. A detailed description of the group and 
role mechanism and the role of AC can be found in [R14]. 
• The relying party (the resource) evaluates the attribute assertions and includes them as 
“evidence” added to a context, which in turn is used when evaluating an access request against 
local policy. As an example, a CE evaluates the FQANs and authorizes the user based on their 
values (see [R14] for details). 
 
5.2. VOMS AND UVOS 
As mentioned in Section 2.3, in Grid environments users are generally organized into virtual 
organizations (VOs). A VO is defined as a group of users and resources (computing) that come 
together for a period of time to perform a particular task. A VO allows the management of users across 
different institutions without the need to observe intra-institutional management structures and 
policies. In practical terms, the management of a VO is facilitated by a Virtual Organization 
Management System (VOMS). In gLite/ARC and UNICORE these are gLite VOMS and UVOS 
respectively. 
The EMI project made effort to provide unification in this area. In effect UNICORE middleware can 
use a VOMS server to obtain user attributes and VO membership information. 
5.2.1 UNICORE Virtual Organization System (UVOS) 
UVOS is a VO-aware attribute information point that is an alternative to the gLite VOMS. UVOS 
provides several minor features related to attribute management and deployment scenarios which are 
not available in VOMS. These features are necessary for the internal security model of UNICORE. A 
diagram of UVOS in UNICORE can be seen in Figure 6: 
10 VOMS also supports a third type of attributes: the Generic Attributes (GA). They are arbitrary key-value pairs 
that the VOMS administrator defines. Thus, they are VO-specific and have no meaning for the generic 
infrastructure. Therefore, they are not used by EMI services nor are policies for their usage defined. These are 
not considered in this document any further. 
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UVOS offers only the SAML interface to query for attributes. Therefore UVOS can be used 
exclusively with the UNICORE middleware stack as gLite and ARC may only consume attributes 
embedded in proxy certificates. The EMI project maintains UVOS for existing UNICORE 
deployments requiring its specific functionality, but UVOS is not pro-actively enhanced. UVOS has 
also an alternative use case: it can be used as an authentication service allowing for integration of its 
users with SAML-based federations. 
5.2.2 Virtual Organization Management System (VOMS) 
The Virtual Organization Membership Service (VOMS) is an attribute authority which serves as the 
central repository for VO user authorization information. VOMS provides support for sorting users 
into group hierarchies, keeping track of their roles and other attributes in order to issue trusted 
attribute certificates and SAML assertions used in the Grid environment for authorization purposes. 
 
The main idea of VOMS is to augment a user's credentials with additional attributes, thus 
allowing services to retrieve them and take authorization decisions on their basis. In a typical 
Grid job submission scenario, a Grid user requests their bag of VOMS trusted attributes 
from the VOMS service (typically included in the form of an X.509 Attribute Certificate embedded in 
an X.509 proxy certificate) and submits a job to the Grid together with the X.509 proxy certificate. 
These attributes will then be used to authorize operations according to the user position in the VO 
context, see Figure 7. 
 
Figure 6: UNICORE UVOS 
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The VOMS Attribute Authority can issue the following types of attributes: 
• Groups reflect the VO internal structure by defining a tree where membership in a subgroup 
implies membership in a parent group. 
• Roles are used to assign special privileges to users in the context of a VOMS group. Roles are 
issued only on explicit user’s request. 
• Generic attributes are (name, value) pairs which can be used to represent user attributes that 
do not directly map to the organizational structure of the VO (its groups and roles) but identify 
some other property on which authorization decisions can be taken. 
 
The groups and roles are encoded using Fully Qualified Attribute Name [1] (FQAN) attributes. Each 
FQAN contains the user membership information regarding the VO and groups and also the roles the 
user may assume. An alternative SAML encoding of the groups and role membership has been 
developed during the EMI project to support the Common Virtual Organization Attribute profile 
[R38]. 
 
 
Figure 7: VOMS concept 
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VOMS is composed of two main components: 
• The VOMS core service, which issues attribute certificates to authenticated clients; 
• The VOMS Admin service, which is used by VO manager to administer VOs and manage 
user membership details and also implements a SAML attribute authority. 
 
Besides the above components, VOMS provides Java and C++ APIs that are included in all major Grid 
services to retrieve and validate VOMS attributes. 
 
5.3. PROFILES FOR POLICY DEFINITION 
The authorization service enforces access policies. These policies are specified in a language such as 
the XML-based XACML [R36] (the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language). XACML is very 
generic - it merely specifies the syntactic structure of access rules and their combinations. In order to 
support a given application like ours (controlling access to Grid resources), XACML needs to be 
enriched with a “vocabulary” of attributes to be used in access rules. Such vocabularies are called 
profiles. Profiles define not only the names, types, and allowed cardinalities of attributes, but also, 
importantly, textual descriptions of the semantics, i.e. how the attributes should be set and interpreted. 
Two such profiles have been developed in EMI: 
 
• The Common XACML Authorization Profile [R37] defines a common set of attributes for 
authorization decisions. This includes attributes for “subject” principals and their means of 
authentication, Virtual Organizations (VOs) and groups within them, resource owners, and 
different actions to which access is desired. The profile also includes attributes which can 
enrich the outcome of the authorization decision beyond a simple “yes” or “no” response: 
These take the form of obligations (to the consumer of the decision), which can contain 
POSIX user/group IDs and environment variables to be used in the resource’s local execution 
environment. See Section 5.4 below on how this can be used. 
• The Common Virtual Organization Attribute Profile [R38] specifies attributes for expressing a 
user’s VO memberships, as well as group memberships and roles within those VOs. This 
profile is intended for use with SAML assertions. It provides an important bridging function 
between those middleware “dialects” that use X.509 proxy certificates based on VO 
information, and others that use SAML to assert attributes about users. 
Figure 8: The VOMS Architecture 
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5.4. ARGUS AUTHORIZATION SERVICE 
The Argus authorization service was developed in the EGEE-III project to address the lack of a 
consistent and accurate application of authorization policy across the Grid. It has been continued and 
adopted by EMI as the standard Authorization service. The initial primary focus of the authorization 
service is limited to the problem space of access control to services in general or service operations in 
specific. Other specific issues like data access authorization have not been addressed yet, although 
every effort has been made to ensure that the service is sufficiently general to apply to other areas as 
well. 
5.4.1 What is a Policy? 
The core concept of the authorization service is that of a policy. Policies, however, are nothing new in 
Grid middleware. The gridmap files currently used in gLite are an example of a very simple policy. 
However some deployers may wish to communicate more robust policies, for example: 
1. Do not allow jobs from anyone on the site's banned list. 
2. Do not allow jobs from anyone on a Grid-wide banned list11. 
3. Allow only jobs that execute programs present on the site's application white list. 
4. Allow individuals from the site to submit work to site resources and, from 8.00 – 17.00, give 
their work a priority of “highest”. 
5. Allow any individual to submit work to site resources.  From 8.00 – 17.00 given their work a 
priority of “low” and a priority of “normal” any other time. 
6. All jobs started by a pilot job12 must use a credential associated with the same VO that from 
which the pilot job originated. 
As can be seen from the examples, policies may pull in information from other sources (e.g. a Grid-
wide banned list), be based on submitter, environment (e.g. time), and job (e.g. program to execute) 
properties, and require certain responsibilities (e.g. giving work a specific priority) for an affirmative 
decision to be valid. 
5.4.2 Service Goals 
The primary goal of the authorization service is to accurately and consistently apply authorization 
policies across Grid resources. This process starts by allowing authoritative individuals to write and 
maintain their policies thus increasing the chance that the policy will be accurate. These policies are 
then automatically distributed across the Grid in a relatively short period of time (i.e. minutes to hours) 
ensuring that all services are eventually operating with a consistent, up-to-date, set of policies.  Finally, 
all services use the same policy evaluation engine and so always end up with consistent results. 
At a more technical level the service also attempts to provide very good tools and information to 
deployment and troubleshooting staff. For example, robust audit logs that may be used to track users 
and simple command line tools for adding new policies or determining an effective, point-in-time 
policy.  Additionally, the components of the service are designed to be very scalable and highly 
resistant to failure, when deployed in a network configuration. The authorization service client is kept 
as small and simple as possible to allow for easier deployment (i.e. to avoid library dependency 
conflicts) and lower the barrier of entry in creating clients in other languages. Lastly, a great deal of 
effort is invested to make sure that components can be deployed in numerous models in order to allow 
a balancing of factors like complexity, latency, and response time. 
5.4.3 Authorization Service Architecture 
The authorization service is made up of four individual components (see Figure 9). The Policy 
Administration Point (PAP) is the repository for policies. Generally speaking, each organization that 
contains an author of policies will run a PAP. The Policy Decision Point (PDP) is the policy evaluation 
11 E.g. the Operational Site Coordination Team (OSCT) of EGEE could operate such a Grid-wide banning list. 
12 Pilot jobs are explained in Section 5.5. 
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engine. The Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) acts as the client to the authorization service. It sends 
authorization decision requests to the PDP and provides the resulting information back to the invoking 
code (e.g. CREAM, glexec). The Execution Environment Service (EES) works with the PDP to 
provide the constraints, or context, under which an authorization decision is valid (e.g. run the job 
under this UID/GID). 
The communication between components is performed using the eXtensible Access Control Markup 
Language (XACML) profile for the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML). The policies 
exchanged between PAPs are expressed in the XACML policy language. 
 
 
Figure 9: The Argus Architecture 
The effective policy for a given authorization decision is the composition of a site's local policy as 
well as any remote policies.  The site has final control over which remote policies are pulled and how 
those policies affect the overall policy decision. For example, a site may indicate that if any policy, 
local or remote, indicates that the request is allowed than the returned result should be “permit”. 
Alternatively a site may indicate that its policy should overrule remote policies, or vice versa. 
Lastly, the deployment model depicted in Figure 9 is likely to be the model used in most cases. 
However, deploying the PAP, PDP, and EES components is not without some amount of work.  An 
organization may choose to use an alternative deployment model if they wish. PAP, PDP, and EES 
components may be hosted and run by a third party. Therefore an organization may outsource any, or 
all, of these components as a means of reducing the complexity at their site at a cost of increased 
request/response latency. 
 
5.5. IDENTITY SWITCHING ON THE WORKER NODES 
Users in the EMI system are identified with globally unique names, either derived from their X.509 
credential subject name or other subject attributes. However, many local services, in particular all 
computing services offered on Unix [5] and Unix-like platforms, and some data storage systems that 
employ posix style file systems, use a different native representation of the user and group concepts. In 
the Unix domain, these are expressed as (numeric) identifiers, where each user is assigned a user 
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identifier (uid) and one or more group identifiers (gid). At any one time, a single gid will be the 
‘primary’ gid (pgid) of a particular process. The pgid will be used as the gid under which any new files 
are created, and for group-level accounting for processes and in batch systems. The uid and gid 
representation is local to each administrative domain. 
In storage systems, back-ends have implemented either a static mapping (largely due to the fine-
grained control policies associated with data) or perform access control based on the external 
attributes. On the Unix job execution side, the need for a system-local credential cannot be evaded, 
since the isolation and security properties of Unix rely on unique and distinct uids and gids. Unless 
distinct credentials are used, jobs running within the same operating system environment cannot be 
isolated using portable cross-platform mechanisms. 
In the most straight-forward case, a request to execute a Grid job at a given site is mapped directly at 
by the computing service to a local identity, under which the job will be executed on the WN as 
scheduled by the local resource management system. The authorized service can return a local identity 
(using the EES or equivalent local mechanisms) and if the compute service runs with sufficient 
privileges in the execution domain, the resulting job process can be launched with the mapped user 
credentials. In this scenario, once the local identity has been determined, it would not be changed, until 
the requested job has ended. 
There are however two cases where an additional component is needed to perform the identity switch: 
in case the computing service does run in a context with the appropriate system privileges (e.g. it is 
run in a Java virtual machine, or as an otherwise non-privileged user; and in case the identity switch is 
not performed on the service end, but elsewhere in the business chain of the job. 
gLite and ARC support the execution of pilot jobs, a special kind of job that is submitted to a 
computing resource but which acts as a ‘container’ placeholder to retrieve other workload, potentially 
owned by a different entity. Once this pilot job starts to run on a worker node, it pulls one or more jobs 
from a dedicated service outside the control of the site’s local compute service and executes them one 
after the other. The advantage of the pilot job concept is that it allows selecting the next job at the 
time, when a slot on a site has become available. In other words, the user’s job will not be assigned to 
a given site early and risks to remain waiting for a long time until a slot has become available in the 
Local Resource Management System (LRMS). Instead, the user’s job is waiting in a special scheduler, 
which takes the scheduling decision at the time a slot on the Grid is available. They are called late 
binding, in contrast to early binding. 
Pilot jobs offer the option of either running the user’s job, called payload job, under the identity of the 
pilot job, or under the identity corresponding to the payload job’s proxy certificate. The latter option 
requires that the identity must be switched on the WN. 
Both use cases are supported by a single component: gLExec [R20]. gLExec is a program to make the 
required mapping between the grid world and the Unix notion of users and groups, and has the 
capacity to enforce that mapping by resetting the uid and gids of running processes. For a service 
running under a ’generic’ uid, such as a web services container, it provides the way to escape from this 
container uid. It may be used in a similar by externally managed services run on a site’s edge. Lastly, 
in a late-binding scenario, the identity of the workload owner can be set at the instance the job starts 
executing. 
The actual mapping of external credentials and attributes to a system-local credential is performed by 
gLExec using the LCMAPS credential mapping service. LCMAPS can make a local mapping 
decision, in large deployments; it may be advantageous to use a single, centralized point where all 
policy and credential mapping state is kept. They especially useful in case multiple end-points are used 
for like services, or when the compute and Grid storage services share a common set of POSIX-style 
file systems that rely on uid and gid access controls, e.g. the Network File System NFS.  Similarly, this 
mapping consistency is relevant for the ‘gLExec on Worker Node’ scenario, where consistency in uids 
and gids on the worker nodes and on the batch server is advantageous, but keeping consistency in 
mapping amongst the worker nodes is necessarily a central function. 
The LCAS and LCMAPS services, as well as the PEP client employed via LCMAPS, are common 
elements are incorporated in various tools. Through the PEP call-out, the full flexibility of the Argus 
authorization service is available, and gLExec passes all incoming attributes to the authorization 
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service through the PEP client. Services such as the EES (described above) then can make central 
mappings that are communicated back to gLExec through the LCMAPS PEP client. Similar clients are 
available for authorization services based on the SAML2XACML2 standard interface, such as those 
profiled by the collaboration of EGEE, Open Science Grid VO Privilege project and Globus. 
Optionally, some rudimentary authorization and access control can be done through the LCAS system, 
but using VOMS FQAN and identity subject attributes from the pushed-credentials only, but 
delegating such decisions to the authorization service via the LCMAPS PEP client allows more 
flexibility and better integration with other services. 
INFSO-RI-261611 2010-2013 © Members of EMI collaboration PUBLIC 34 / 48 
 EMI SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
 Doc. Identifier: EMI-DOC-JRA1-EMI_Security_Architecture_v1.0 
 
 
6. DATA MANAGEMENT 
 
6.1. UNENCRYPTED DATA STORAGE 
Several data storage systems that store the data unencrypted are supported by EMI - the Disk Pool 
Manager (DPM), dCache and StoRM. 
6.1.1 Disk Pool Manager (DPM) and LHC File Catalogue (LFC) 
All the files managed by DPM on a given installation are owned by the same Unix account, which 
serves as a management account. Every DPM instance contains a name service (a local database), 
where the actual file name, ownership and access information resides. The services exposed by DPM 
consult this name service for obtaining authorization information. Internally to DPM, every user and 
group is represented in this local database by a virtual UID and virtual GID, which is independent of 
any Unix UID or GID for the hosting operating system. These virtual UID/GIDs are just 
representations of individual users and groups of users. 
The authorization mechanisms in DPM are based on how DPM maps the user credentials (proxy 
certificate with or without VOMS AC) to the virtual UID and GIDs. The mechanism is depends 
whether the proxy certificates contains a VOMS AC or not. In both cases the virtual UID is derived 
from the DN and the virtual GID either from the FQANs or a data management specific map file. 
LFC, a file catalogue, is using the same model, whereas its virtual UID and GIDs are not correlated to 
the values used by DPM. More information on the DPM security model can be found in [R14]. 
6.1.2 The dCache Security Model (gPlazma) 
dCache is using the second version of the “grid-aware PLuggable AuthoriZation Management” system 
(gPlazma2) for authentication, credential mapping and related operations. Whenever a request enters 
the system, gPlazma performs 4 steps, which are 'authentication', 'mapping', 'account' and 'session'. 
The configuration is similar to the UNIX PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) Subsystem 
allowing particular steps to be declared optional, mandatory etc. The pluggable mechanism allows 
dCache authentication to be customized to the requirements of the security infrastructure of sites 
running dCache. gPlazma modules can be provided or modified without deep knowledge of dCache   
and can be applied to a dCache installation 'in vivo'. At the time being, EMI dCache releases are 
shipped with gPlazma modules supporting Kerberos, X.509 Certificates, X.509 Proxies and 
User/Password authentication, ARGUS blacklisting and LDAP (ActiveDirectory)/NIS and GridMap 
file user mappings as well as GUMS, the Open Science Grid User Management Service. 
6.1.3 StoRM Security Model 
The Storage Resource Manager (StoRM) exposes a SRM Web Service interface as the only user 
interface. This interface is exposed by the StoRM “FrontEnd” component, a service that may be 
deployed on a host that does not access the SE storage. 
When a user invokes the SRM Web Service they must provide a X.509 Proxy certificate with VOMS 
extensions, afterwards the communication between the endpoints is performed via http protocol over 
GSI. The first authorization step is performed in the FrontEnd where the X.509 proxy and VOMS 
FQANs are validated. Subsequently the user DN identified in the X.509 proxy is checked for 
blacklisting via Argus. The Argus blacklisting verification can be disabled by the site administrator. 
This pre-validated request is then sent to StoRM “BackEnd” component, a service that resides on a 
host with full access to the SE storage. The communication between FrontEnd and BackEnd is 
performed via XML-RPC over HTTP. The StoRM BackEnd is configured to receive such calls only 
from the IP address of the FrontEnd host. All the SE storage files managed by StoRM are owned by 
the Unix account of the user running the StoRM BackEnd service. StoRM considers all its files as 
residing in a certain Storage Area. 
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When the BackEnd receives a request for interactions with a file first of all it verifies that the user 
performing the request is allowed to approach the Storage Area hosting the request by inspecting their 
DN, VO and role. Upon validation, the user is mapped to a local Unix user using the information 
contained in the GridMap file and LCMAPS library. If a valid local user is found the request has to 
pass a further authorization step: the requested SRM operation is mapped to a file system-like 
operation and the authorization for the local user to perform this operation on the requested file is 
verified using the information stored in the Path Authorization file. The definition of the policies 
stored in this file is up to the site administrator. 
When all the authorization steps are passed an extended ACL is stored on the requested file for the 
requested operation to the local Unix user in order to allow users to access StoRM resources via the 
file:// protocol. Depending on the configuration of the Storage Area this information can be transient 
(with a well-defined lifetime) or permanent. 
6.1.4 The File Transfer Service (FTS) 
The File Transfer Service (FTS) is a service that moves data from one SE to another over a defined 
channel between the sites. FTS operates on individual files as well as sets of files. It has dedicated 
interfaces for managing the network resources and to display statistics about transfers. Optionally, it 
also supports lookup and registration of files in catalogues. The authorization is based on defined 
roles, to which the user is mapped using their DN. Mapping based on FQAN will be supported in the 
future. 
FTS renews expiring proxy certificates through the use of MyProxy, similar to the renewal mechanism 
as described in Section 3.8). More information on the FTS security model can be found in [R14]. 
 
6.2. ENCRYPTED DATA STORAGE 
The encrypted data service solution provides a system that encrypts/decrypts files and stores/retrieves 
them from GFAL library-compliant storage systems. For additional security and redundancy, the 
encryption keys used to encrypt the files are split and stored in separate keystores (Hydra servers). 
Hydra [R19] is the central element in the encrypted file storage solution. The Hydra service comprises 
at least one Hydra server and a set of command-line interfaces to perform the basic commands. The 
Hydra server consists of a MySQL database and a Tomcat server that acts to contain the actual Hydra 
software, written in Java. Communication between the Hydra services and clients is through SOAP. 
The encrypted data service solution uses the Hydra servers to store the pieces of the encryption key 
and their associated Access Control List (ACL) information. Therefore the key pieces are only 
accessible by their respective owners. These encryption keys are split using a particular scheme, 
Shamir Secret-Sharing Scheme (SSSS) that provides another layer of protection. The encryption key 
may be split into "M" fragments and may be recovered with possession of "N" fragments, where 
N<M. These parameters "M" and "N" are configurable by the number of Hydra servers deployed and 
the SSSS algorithm respectively. In this case, the security and reliability of the overall service has been 
increased: an attacker would have to gain access to at least "N" Hydra keystores to recover and 
encryption key; a legitimate user can tolerate the loss of M-N keystores and still recover their key. In 
addition, a legitimate administrator of any single Hydra keystore would not have access to the full 
encryption key. 
Encryption keys are generated in the Hydra system based upon the concept of a globally unique 
identity (GUID) of the file in question to be encrypted. This GUID can be retrieved from sources such 
as an LCG File Catalog (LFC) that contains the logical names for files inside a Disk Pool Manager 
(DPM) storage element. The GUID is necessary for retrieval and decryption of files. 
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7. LOGGING, TRACING AND AUDITING 
Being able to trace and audit past actions is a prerequisite for operating an infrastructure in a secure 
and stable manner. Although the primary focus here is on the security aspects, traceability and logging 
is a prominent element of all software since it is the key element for tracing stability issues, finding 
bugs, and generally maintaining an operational service by system managers. As such, the (security) 
logging capabilities of the software are continuously exercised not for security purposes but for 
operational reasons. 
However this is only possible if consistent and complete logging information is produced by all 
services. The EGI Security Policy group, leveraging work of the joint EGEE/OSG/WLCG security 
policy group (JSPG), have described the criteria for adequate logging: “The minimum level of 
traceability for Grid usage is to be able to identify the source of all actions (executables, file transfers, 
pilot jobs, portal jobs, etc.) and the individual who initiated them. […] The aim is to be able to answer 
the basic questions who, what, where, and when concerning any incident. This requires retaining all 
relevant information, including timestamps and the digital identity of the user, sufficient to identify, for 
each service instance, and for every security event including at least the following: connect, 
authenticate, authorize (including identity changes) and disconnect.”[R21]. 
Especially is a distributed infrastructure, the ‘hand-over’ of work flows between services, maintaining 
forward (and where possible) backward references to each services log data, is important. To 
implement requirements such as those from the EGI SPG, the EGEE-II Middleware Security Group 
MWSG, in collaboration with its global partners, defined the “Middleware Security Audit Logging 
Guidelines” [R22]. 
Although the document today is not followed to the letter with regards to format, the spirit of the 
document has permeated all EMI services, and almost all of the relevant information today is logged 
using site-central mechanisms like syslog, and forward identifiers are kept. Traceability for job 
execution services has been assessed in operational scenarios and exercises run by EGI in ‘security 
service challenges’ [R23] and workflows can be followed across multiple service end points. The 
logging of storage services and correlation of storage and compute actions remains largely based on 
correlating identities and time stamps. There can be also be site-specific auditing mechanisms; since 
the end-user supplied code it used initiated elements of the workflow. Sites availing themselves of 
operating-system based auditing (e.g. for those OSes targeting Common Criteria compliance) have 
more correlation possibilities using those mechanisms. 
Apart from operational feed-back there is no formal monitoring of compliance of code with the audit 
guidelines, nor does EMI have itself a single set of mandatory audit formats. 
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8. SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND THREATS HANDLING 
The software (security and otherwise) provided by the EMI project is, of course, released for use by 
various Grid users or clients e.g. EGI and WLCG. As issues (vulnerabilities or bugs) are identified they 
are assessed and prioritized in a joint process between clients and EMI. These then arrive to the EMI 
developers as bugs to be fixed. Concurrently, the EMI project has a more formal program of 
evaluation of software components for security flaws. 
 
8.1. SOFTWARE SECURITY MANAGEMENT 
The project has a formal process for handing security vulnerabilities identified in the software. It has 
both a pro-active and a re-active method for dealing with potential vulnerabilities. 
For the pro-active approach, EMI software which performs key functions that potentially affect 
security are identified and analyzed through a first principles vulnerability analysis [Kupsch, Miller, 
Heyman, Cesar, “First Principles Vulnerability Analysis” [R24]. Although by nature a laborious 
process, the first principles analysis is better than automated tools in finding exploitable 
vulnerabilities. This analysis has been done for selected EMI software products that are security 
sensitive, such as gLExec and VOMS. Vulnerabilities found have been addressed and mitigated, and 
disclosed using the industry-standard CVE process. 
Reactive vulnerability management has been formalised with a set of defined response and resolution 
times, and agreed with major stakeholders such as EGI. Here resolution times have been agreed; with 
for example a 48 hours resolution time after reporting for extremely critical issues (resolution can 
either be a software fix, a configuration change, or a patch to deployed installations). Other low-
priority vulnerabilities are either distributed as part of the regular software release cycle or made 
available as updates. 
The risk ranking is not done solely by EMI, but through the Risk Assessment Team (RAT) jointly set 
up by EGI and the major European middleware providers and customers, including EMI, IGE, and 
WLCG and selected outside experts, under the aegis of EGI.eu. The RAT is responsible for ranking the 
risk of each vulnerability, taking into account the operational environment, according to the EGI 
Software Vulnerability Issue Handling Procedure [R25]. The RAT is managed by the EGI Software 
Vulnerability Group (SVG) [R26] with oversight from EGI, EMI, IGE and others. 
Operational security issues and vulnerabilities which have already been disclosed are handled by the 
EGI CSIRT Incident Response Task Force [R27] who assesses the risk and impact of the issue. Here 
the RAT and EMI as a software provider are involved as experts, but have a more reactive role than in 
vulnerabilities that are responsibly disclosed and managed. However, the same service levels and 
response times apply. 
 
8.2. BUG FIXES, EMERGENCY RELEASES 
The EMI middleware stack is released to infrastructure projects such as WLCG and EGI. These 
projects, during the course of running the EMI stack, discover issues (bugs). These bugs are reported 
through a standard ticket processing management system, Global Grid User Support (GGUS) run by 
EGI. The bug reports are processed and the EMI developers are in the role as third-line support and 
receive bugs that cannot be closed by EGI. Subsequently, a bug is opened in the product team bug 
tracker and the issue is solved. These interactions are documented in more detail at [R51]. 
Software releases are regularly scheduled and are documented; see Annex EMI Maintenance and 
Release Processes. If the EGI RAT (see Section 8.1) assesses a security vulnerability as critical, then 
an emergency release can be made. This procedure is not limited to security software and is handled 
by the EMI SA1 work package.  
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8.3. GRID SERVICES SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
Within the EMI project, effort has been devoted to perform a software and functional security analysis 
on various EMI components – these are independent software security experts who are not directly 
part of any development team. Inclusion of these experts in the EMI project is seen as the most 
efficient way to gain access to objective software security analyses. 
These assessments followed the First Principles Vulnerability Assessment methodology (FPVA), 
which is a manual (analyst-centric) methodology aimed at finding critical vulnerabilities first. Critical 
vulnerabilities are those affecting high value assets. Given that FPVA is a manual methodology, it is 
slow and therefore expensive. 
Ideally, vulnerability assessments should be performed on all components of the different software 
stacks within EMI. Unfortunately this is not realistic given the resources granted for this activity. So 
far in the EMI project the following EMI components from the gLite stack were assessed. 
 
Component Version Code Base Effort Result 
Argus 1.2 42k lines Java/C 5 months 0 vulnerabilities found. 
gLExec 0.8 48k lines C 4 months 5 vulnerabilities found. 
VOMS-Admin 2.0.18 140k lines Java, 
JSP, Javascript 
2.4 
months 
4 vulnerabilities found 
VOMS core 1.9.19-2 161k lines C/C++ 
exp and Java 
6 months 1 vulnerability  found 
WMS    In progress... 
Table 3: gLite Vulnerability Assessment 
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9. INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIONS 
 
9.1. OGF, IGTF, IGE 
With security being a foundational layer of interoperability, the security area in Open Grid Forum has 
several working groups in which EMI participates. In the software standard activities EMI has a 
leading roles as co-chair of all security working groups (IDEL, VOMS-PROC and formerly OGSA-
AuthZ), and EMI also is closely involved with the operational groups (CAOPS-WG and IGTF). 
The working group on identity delegation (IDEL-WG) was fostered by and is co-chaired by EMI, with 
participation from IGE, XSEDE, OSG and the UK NES. This aligns with the EMI objective to revert 
to the use of a non-modified TLS protocol instead of GFD.078 [R31]. IDEL will consider out-of-band 
delegation protocols, based on SOAP and REST protocols, to propagate delegated credential to 
services in the workflow, with emphasis on identity delegation. 
The format and syntax of the VOMS FQANs was documented through the OGSA-AuthZ-WG in 
GFD.182 [R32], but since this document concerns only the syntax and only addresses the 
interpretation of the attributes in a limited scope, the need for a comprehensive document on the 
ordering, interpretation and combination of VOMS attributes in both the PKI and SAML domains was 
needed. The VOMS-PROC WG, initiated by IGE in collaboration with EMI and XSEDE, addresses 
this issue through two documents: “VOMS Attribute Certificate Parsing Rules for Chained Identity 
Credentials” describing the combination of attributes through a single identity delegation chain, and 
“Understanding parsing rules for collated VOMS SAML space” which addresses the complementary 
elements when expressed using SAML. Both documents are currently in draft. 
EMI also participates in the CAOPS-WG, addressing the technical foundation of trust in the identity 
management space. The CAOPS group, which liaises closely with the International Grid Trust 
Federation IGTF, defines not only the technical profiles of PKIX X.509 for use in the Grid, but also 
drives the move towards secure hash algorithms for certificates and the development of profiles for 
on-line credential status checking using (light-weight RFC 5019-style) OCSP, setting profiles for the 
credential-issuing authorities and proposing guidelines for the use of OCSP in clients. EMI, in 
collaboration with IGE and many national e-Infrastructure projects, contributes to the development of 
the profiles, which are closely aligned with industry – since both the web browser and CA industry and 
grid face the same problems at the same time. 
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10. ASSESSMENT, STRENGTHS, IDEAS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
The Security architectures of the three middleware stacks have been devised and implemented in 
previous projects. These architectures reflect the requirements of the infrastructure operators and their 
users. As the architecture of ARC/gLite has been an iterative and evolutionary process over several 
previous projects and over the years there have been many components that have been created and 
abandoned or stopped. At this current moment the Grid infrastructure (EGI and WLCG) runs in 
continuous operation using X.509 certificates for Authentication and Authorization. 
The EMI security stacks consist of components of ARC, gLite and UNICORE bound together loosely 
with some common services and libraries. The common efforts include: The Common Authentication 
libraries; Common Authorization Service (Argus); Common Attribute Authority (VOMS); Common 
Security Token Service (STS); Common delegation method (to transfer X.509 proxies). 
10.1. STRENGTHS 
There has never, to this date, been a security incident on the Grid due to a fault in the middleware 
(gLite or ARC) security components. All incidents have been traced back to the operating system 
vulnerabilities or well-known attack techniques e.g. phishing. UNICORE also can report the same 
status. The general strengths of the EMI stack are: 
• The common security credential is based on solid industry-standard PKI technology (X.509), 
which is widely used in many critical systems such as in banks and large e-commerce systems. 
It also uses the current versions of standard libraries such as OpenSSL, BouncyCastle. 
• The ability to support Grid deployments, i.e. the deployments where there is a minimal trust 
between participating sites. This is realized by the means of trust delegation (with proxies or 
ETD) and makes the architecture different from vast majority of solutions used in other 
distributed systems. (move up to second point). 
• The deployment is highly scalable as the X.509 proxy functions as the AuthN and AuthZ 
token carrying all the necessary attributes. It is not necessary for all services to contact each 
other to form a web of trust. 
• Common Authentication libraries available throughout the stack and also for external usage. 
Provides common error messages and AuthN responses. 
• Separated AuthN and AuthZ in principle. Argus is not bound to specific AuthN mechanism 
and can use different technologies, e.g. SAML and UNICORE or even http. 
• Convergence on a standard X.509 delegation interface, gridsite. This provides a standard 
method to pass X.509 proxies between services. 
• Able to guarantee a traceable security chain from the user to the computing worker node. This 
is also true for multi-user pilot jobs when gLExec on the WN is deployed and correctly 
configured and used. 
• Support for federated identities to access Grid services through the use of the STS and 
accredited CA. 
10.2. WEAKNESSES 
The process of X.509 proxy delegation results in the impersonation of the original user (submitter to 
Grid). In this process no information on the trust chain of the intermediate services that the proxy has 
passed through is included in the proxy credential. Therefore it is impossible for services further down 
the line to determine whether they can trust the credential and the actions it is requesting. Currently, 
this trust is assumed not expressed. 
Any user credential must be renewed in case the tasks assigned within a Grid exceed the time limit of 
the credential validity. In the case of X.509 proxies the recommended validity is 24 hours. There order 
is to limit the amount of damage that can be caused in case a proxy is stolen. In general, if tasks 
exceed the 24 hour limit then the proxy must be renewed. This renewal process is unwieldy and is 
achieved using several components. These are not issues for the UNICORE middleware that does not 
use proxy certificates but the Explicit Trust Delegation solves the shortcomings of proxies. 
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An overall weakness can be postulated that, in general, the delegation of credentials between services 
and the renewal of credentials is an unwieldy procedure. These services include the CEs, Data storage 
and especially the centralized workload management system (WMS). This concentrates too much 
credential handling and renewal activity in one service. Included is the delegation of credentials from 
the UI to MyProxy servers. The delegation step itself is a weakness as currently all the attributes (and 
therefore rights) are passed in the step. Delegation of a reduced set of attributes is not possible. 
Already, the WLCG experiments have shown that a WMS is not necessary for large-scale physics data 
processing (one of the main use-cases of the Grid). The large physics experiments have moved to a 
pilot-job service model that use pilot job frameworks existing outside the Grid middleware. Here a 
long-lived job, that uses a long-lived pilot credential, is injected into the Grid job management chain. 
Upon final arrival at a worker node this job signals the pilot service to start to send the analysis 
payloads. These analysis payloads are then executed with the credential of the submitter to the pilot 
service. 
EMI security authentication uses PKI also for identifying end-users. The advantages of this approach 
are clear and were numerously mentioned in the document. However usage of X.509 certificates is 
troublesome for end-users: 
• Most of end-users do not understand the PKI and therefore handling of certificates and private 
keys is a big concern. This may lead to security incidents with private keys left unencrypted or 
encrypted with a weak password on a publicly available machine. 
• Handling of certificates and private keys is a big issue for roaming users, users using untrusted 
computers, using several trusted computers and having several identities (i.e. certificates 
issued by different CAs). 
As the authentication (and in case of gLite and ARC also delegation) is tightly coupled with X.509 
certificates, it is difficult to create web interfaces to the EMI middleware. Even with the help of STS 
the integration is very complicated. What is more it is currently impossible to apply even stronger 
authentication mechanisms as Multi Factor Authentication. 
10.3. IMPROVEMENTS 
Direct submission of pilot jobs to the site computing elements (CEs), rather than WMS, would 
eliminate the need for one stage of proxy handling (delegation) and renewal. This is the case presently 
for the CERN LHC experiments but is not generally the case for other EGI Grid communities. 
From the security point of view, if a site detects a malicious payload or activity, then it may either: 
• Ban the pilot credential, therefore protecting itself against further malicious payloads from the 
pilot service. 
• Ban the payload credential, allowing other pilot-submitted payloads to continue. 
 
By eliminating the WMS step, the site that runs the CE can set its own policy on credential lifetime 
and banning policy. 
The overall ease of the middleware could be improved by full integration of the CANl. This would 
give standard error messages to users and administrators and allow standard analysis and monitoring 
tools to be built. Also, with the presence of STS, integration to various portals should be emphasized.  
Security assessments of the EMI stack should be planned as part of the release process. Some NGIs 
are already preforming this work on code that will run in their infrastructures. Code reviews were 
performed during the EMI project and this work highlighted the labor-intensive nature of this work. A 
more uniform migration of the security code to public repositories such as github would make it easier 
for developers to contribute back-patches and examine the code and documentation. 
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As mentioned above the possibility of alternatives to the delegation step should be explored. Possibly 
by reducing the use of delegations to only where it is strictly needed. Another path could be SAML 
adoption within the EMI stack, not just at the interface with the user. This would move the trust from 
the user credential to the service credential. This proposition would require a large amount of work 
and a strong request from the user communities to justify such an improvement in the security of Grid 
infrastructures. The attractions of SAML and ETD are obvious but the reality of maintaining a 
production Grid infrastructure may rule this out. Another effect that is not well-understood is how 
scalable this option would be. The main Grid users are not asking for this feature and probably would 
not accept the disruption. 
If the above proposal is too onerous then the possibility of delegating only some of the users rights 
could be explored. Currently it is too complicated for the majority of the Grid users (in gLite/ARC and 
UNICORE) to determine which attributes (rights) should be selected for the credential to be delegated.  
The only other option is to automate this selection. Therefore the attributes need to be selected at run-
time. Today, this task has not been seriously considered as it has not been requested by users. The 
perceived difficulty of this task coupled with the lack of user requirements makes the potential return 
on investment seem low. 
The UNICORE plans for improving their security architecture are focused on usability and integration 
with existing federations. To achieve this it is planned to support a fully certificate-less access to the 
Grid, what will eliminate all certificate related problems which are faced by end-users, especially in 
web access case. 
The fundamental problem behind certificate less access, where end-user is unable to digitally sign data 
is related to trust delegation. Therefore the main focus is placed on extension of UNICORE Explicit 
Trust Delegation model, so it can be used without the end-user signing the initial trust delegation as it 
is now. 
By definition, the security of commercial clouds is not addressed by the EMI security stack. whereas 
the very act of deploying services and data to resources that are essentially unknown and outside of the 
policies developed by Grid projects and VOs renders any services untrusted. The components and 
services of the EMI Security stacks of course technically can be deployed on virtual machines within a 
commercial “Cloud” infrastructure. Deployment on a “Private Cloud” i.e. a cluster controlled by 
virtualization technologies is no different to a deployment on a traditional cluster and would enjoy the 
same level of guarantees from Grid project and VO policies. 
The delegation services could be deployed within a couple of commercial clouds in order to provide a 
loose federation of their infrastructures. The Argus AuthZ service could be deployed on a Cloud node 
in order to control access to other nodes that a client may have rented. A Cloud client could therefore 
shift their data processing or storage based on various metrics. 
Finally, any improvements to the Security stacks result from requirements of the operators and users 
of the Grid infrastructures. Experience and requirements have shown that any improvements or 
changes must not impede or disrupt operations. Therefore the two scenarios for changes are that they 
are incremental or a complete radical change of direction. Any future projects, large or small, should 
be driven by the user requirements and be controlled by the user communities. 
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ANNEX: EMI MAINTENANCE AND RELEASE PROCESSES 
The EMI Maintenance organization follows the guidelines of the ISO/IEC 14764:2006 (Software 
Engineering - Software Life Cycle Processes - Maintenance) standard, and is documented in the 
[R50]. The process is briefly summarized here. 
In EMI, the maintenance and evolution of the software is implemented inside Product Teams (PTs). 
PTs are small teams of software developers, fully responsible for the successful release of a particular 
software product (or group of tightly related products) compliant with agreed sets of technical 
specification and acceptance criteria. 
Each PT has a Product Team Leader (PTL) who is responsible for coordinating the design, 
development, support and maintenance in the context of the PT. 
The Release Manager (RM) is responsible for the overall coordination of the release process. Main 
duties include steering the release process, planning and managing EMI releases, chairing the EMT 
ensuring that all relevant issues are being followed. 
The Engineering Management Team (EMT) is led by the Release Manager and composed of the 
PTLs (or duly appointed representatives), a QA representative, a Security representative, 
representatives of the operations teams of the major infrastructures (like EGI and PRACE) and invited 
experts as necessary. The EMT manages the release process and the approval of “standard” request for 
changes, that is all the changes that are pre-approved based on established policies and do not need to 
be individually approved by other project boards (i.e. the Project Technical Board (PTB) or the higher 
level Project Execution Board (PEB)). This includes software defects triaging and prioritization, 
technical management of releases, integration issues, and user support request analysis. 
 
Component releases 
The EMI release process is centered on four types of releases: 
Major Release A major release for a component is characterized by a well-defined interface and 
behavior, potentially incompatible with the interface or behavior of a previous release. New major 
releases of a component can be introduced only in a new major release of EMI. 
Minor Release A minor release of a component includes significant interface or behaviour changes 
that are backwards-compatible with those of the corresponding major release. New minor releases of a 
component can be introduced in an existing major release of EMI. 
Revision Releases A revision release of a component includes changes fixing specific defects found in 
production and represents the typical kind of release of a component during the lifetime of an EMI 
major release. 
Emergency Releases An emergency release of a component includes changes fixing only Immediate-
priority defects found in production, typically security-related. 
 
Maintenance and support schedule 
EMI major releases will be supported and maintained for two years after the release date. The 
availability of a new major release of EMI does not automatically obsolete the previous ones and 
multiple major releases may be supported at the same time according to their negotiated end-of-life 
policies. It is foreseen, however, that only the latest two EMI major releases are supported at any time. 
Within an EMI major release only the latest version of a component is supported. 
The maintenance schedule is organized in the following periods: 
Full maintenance period: during this period updates are released to address issues in the code and 
provide new features are provided for each supported EMI major release (12 months). 
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Standard maintenance period: during this period updates are released to address issues in the code, 
but no new feature is introduced for each supported EMI major release (6 months). 
Security updates period: during this period only updates targeting security vulnerabilities are 
provided for each supported EMI major release (6 months). 
End-of-life period: in this period no updates or support is provided any more. The end-of-life period 
starts after the end of the security updates period. 
Specific exceptions to the above maintenance periods can be negotiated between the users and the PTs 
depending on various criteria that include critical run-time of experiments or projects that do not allow 
upgrades to new versions, particularly complex deployment and migration conditions, etc. 
 
Problem analysis 
Request For Changes (RfCs) are classified according to priority, where the priority is a composition of 
the factors like severity, impact, urgency and cost. The evaluation of the priority of an RfC results in 
one of four possible logical values: Immediate, High, Medium and Low. Each level implies a very 
specific behavior for the management of that RfC. In particular, the behaviours are: 
• Immediate: the RfC needs to be addressed as soon as possible, in all affected EMI major 
releases on all supported platforms. A release containing Immediate-priority changes can 
contain only Immediate-priority changes. Multiple Immediate-priority changes can be 
included in the same release, provided that any change does not delay the release significantly. 
This constraint minimizes the risk of introducing new defects in the new release of the 
affected component and allows the adoption of special accelerated procedures for its release. 
Moreover it will not force site administrators to deploy lower-priority changes during an 
emergency update. 
• High: The RfC will be addressed in a next release of the affected component, in all affected 
EMI major releases on all supported platforms. 
• Medium: The RfC will be addressed in the release of the affected component that will be 
shipped with the next EMI major release. 
• Low: There is no target date for addressing the RfC. 
 
Security vulnerabilities, according to their risk assessed by the EGI-SVG Risk Assessment Team 
(RAT) and the affected PT leader, are mapped to RfCs tracked in EMI trackers in accordance with the 
SVG Software Vulnerability Handling Process. Vulnerabilities risk can be categorized as Critical, 
High, Moderate or Low. A target solution date is defined for each risk when the risk is assessed, and 
represents the time by which a fix for the vulnerability should be available in production repositories. 
The target date for the risk categories is defined as follows: 
• Critical: 3 days 
• High: 6 weeks 
• Moderate: 4 months 
• Low: 1 year 
 
Once the risk has been assessed the EMI RM, in agreement with the affected PT, schedules a release 
in compliance with the target date. The progress on the vulnerability handling is followed up in a 
private issue tracker provided by EGI, where all the appropriate parties are contacted and represented. 
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Once the issue is resolved in the code an advisory is issued by the SVG. This advisory is referenced by 
the release notes of the affected products so that the disclosure of information regarding the 
vulnerability is properly controlled. 
SVG defines a special procedure for the Critical risk vulnerabilities which aims at involving as quickly 
as possible all the relevant experts to assess the nature and exploitability of the vulnerability and to 
produce a patch as quickly as possible or provide other recommendations to contain the vulnerability 
as effectively as possible. For more details, see the Software Vulnerability Handling Process [R25]. 
No critical vulnerabilities have been discovered in EMI products during the EMI project. 
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